Cold War Submarines

The Design and Construction of U.S. and Soviet Submarines, 1945-2001By K. J. Moore & Norman Polmar
336 pages; 8 X 11 inches $60.00
ISBN 1574885944
Submarines had a vital, if often unheralded, role in the superpower navies during the Cold War. Their crews carried out intelligence-collection operations, sought out and stood ready to destroy opposing submarines, and, from the early 1960s, threatened missile attacks on their adversary’s homeland, providing in many respects the most survivable nuclear deterrent of the Cold War. For both East and West, the modern submarine originated in German U-boat designs obtained at the end of World War II. Although enjoying a similar technology base, by the 1990s the superpowers had created submarine fleets of radically different designs and capabilities. Written in collaboration with the former Soviet submarine design bureaus, Norman Polmar and K. J. Moore authoritatively demonstrate in this landmark study how differing submarine missions, antisubmarine priorities, levels of technical competence, and approaches to submarine design organizations and management caused the divergence.This book is one of the finest works ever written on submarines of the latter half of the 20th century. Mr Polmar is well known in naval circles and needs no further introduction here. Mr Moore obviously knows submarines very well as a founder of the research firm Cortana.
In addition, the work is blessed with the excellent drawings of AD Baker III, which highlight both submarines built and designs that never got beyond the concept stage.
One of the greatest strengths of this book is the records afforded the authors from the former Soviet design bureaus. One of the most startling facts I learned was the fact the Soviet Navy had virtually abandoned any ideas of a potential new Battle of the Atlantic by the late 1950s. One only need to thinks of the enormous amount of time and resources NATO devoted in the 1960s through the end of the Cold War on this very scenario to find this so startling.
Some mention is made of the Walker Spy Case, however not too many details are included in what must still be a highly classified analysis of the results against US efforts.
The role of Hyman Rickover is examined, a field Mr Polmar is well suited to as he wrote a biography on the late Admiral a number of years ago. The Rickover interference and bureaucratic initiatives resulted in the US Navy not having the most capable submarines available for duty, which they could have had.
A few minor errors were noted in the book:
On page 123, it states that no surface ships were equipped to carry Polaris missiles. In fact, the Italian light cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi was fitted with the launch tubes during a modernization in the early 1960s. It is not believed that she ever carried a missile to sea however.
On page 233, USS Ohio is misidentified as SSBN 724 instead of SSBN 726.
Also on page 302 mention is made of the threat posed by Soviet/Russian wake-homing torpedoes. No mention is made of the extensive trials undertaken by USS Nimitz at the CFMETR Range at Nanoose BC prior to leaving for Norfolk to undergo her three year RCOH yard period.
Apart from these minor points, this work is highly recommended as one of the finest works to date on what was once a highly classified subject.